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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael Eugene Koch appeals from the judgment of conviction imposed
upon the jury's verdicts finding him guilty of four counts of lewd conduct with a
minor under sixteen.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Koch's daughter, T.K., was a classmate and friend of thirteen-year old
C.C.

(Tr., Vol. I, p.278, L25 - p.279, L24.)

During her 8th grade year, C.C.

began to have problems at home. (Tr., Vol. I. p.280, L24 - p.282, L2.) Her
adoptive father drank heavily, her parents often fought, and her mother
eventually moved out of the house. (Tr., Vol. I, p.223, L2 - p.225, L21; p.229,
Ls.6-16; p.280, L24 - p.282, L2.) C.C. began to spend more time at the home
of the Kochs', with whom she became close. (Tr., Vol. I, p.228, L19 - p.230,
L7; p.282, L16 - p.284, L9.)
Koch and his wife, Salina, had open and liberal sexual attitudes. (Tr., Vol.
I, p.287, L 12 - p.288, L.23; p.300, L20 - p.309, L24.) C.C. observed vibrators
and pornography displayed openly in the Kochs' house. (Id.) A "sex swing" hung
overtly from the ceiling of the master bedroom. (Tr., Vol. I, p.302, L9 - p.303,
L15; p.641, Ls.21-23.)

The Kochs often discussed sexual matters in C.C.'s

presence, and purchased vibrators for C.C. and T.K.. (Tr., Vol. I, p.288, LS.1723; p.299, L 19 - p.309, L24.)

1

Eventually, Koch began to engage in detailed discussions with C.C. about
his marriage and sex life.

(Tr., Vol. I, p.289, L.7 - p.290, L.8; p.302, L.25 -

p.305, L.10.) Koch purchased C.C. lace underwear from Victoria's Secret. (Tr.,
p.312, L.25 - p.314, L.13.) He also told C.C. that he loved her and wanted to
marry her. (Tr., Vol. I, p.317, Ls.18-19.)
In the spring of C.C.'s 8th grade year, Koch drove C.C. to a street
alongside a subdivision, where he digitally penetrated C.C.'s vagina. (Tr., Vol. I,
p.297, Ls.15-20.) C.C. then performed oral sex on Koch. (Tr., Vol. I, p.297, L.19
- p.298, L.4.) Koch implored C.C. to keep their sexual activities secret. (Tr., Vol.
I, p.298, Ls.5-15.)

On another occasion, Koch picked C.C. up at her house

where was she home sick from school and took her to his house where he twice
engaged in sexual intercourse with her, including once while C.C. was in the sex
swing.

(Tr., Vol. I, p.319, L.8 - p.325, L.6.) Koch also had sex with C.C. on

another occasion while his family was attending a Girl Scout play. (Tr., Vol. I,
p.326, L.5 - p.327, L.8.) Sometime later, C.C. stopped spending time at Kochs'
house and ended her friendship with T.K .. (Tr., Vol. I, p.329, L.7 - p.354, L.3.)
In the fall of her 9th grade year, C.C. took the glass out of a picture frame
and slit her wrists after a fight with her mother. (Tr., Vol. I, p.353, L.4 - p.354,
L.11.) C.C. was admitted to Intermountain Hospital where she was treated for
five days.

(Tr., Vol. I, p.354, Ls.12-16.)

There, C.C. disclosed her sexual

relationship with Koch. (Tr., Vol. I, p.354, p.17 - p.334, L.2.)
A law enforcement investigation commenced.

(Tr., Vol. I, p.355, L.18 -

p.357, L.6.) Officers arranged a confrontation call between C.C. and Koch. (Tr.,
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Vol. I, p.357, L.12 - p.365, L.3.) In the recorded call, C.C. confronted Koch about
their sexual relationship. (See generally state's exhibit 19.) In the course of the
call, Koch did not expressly admit sexual contact with C.C., but also did not
refute C.C.'s accusations. (Id.) He also expressed his love for C.C. and his fear
that he was going to jail. (Id.)
A grand jury indicted Koch on four counts of lewd conduct with a minor
under sixteen. (R., pp.26-27.) After a trial, the jury found Koch guilty on all four
counts.

(R., pp.182-185.) The district court imposed a concurrent unified 25-

year sentence with five years fixed on each count. (R., pp.199-204.) Koch timely
appealed. (R., pp.216-219.)
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ISSUES

Koch states the issues on appeal as:

A.

Did the court err by denying Mr. Koch's discovery request for a
written summary of expected testimony along with the facts and
data supporting that opinion from the state's expert witness?

B.

Did one of the many trial and evidentiary errors by the court deprive
Mr. Koch of his constitutional due process right to a [fair] trial?

C.

1.

Did the court err in denying Mr. Koch's objection during
opening statements?

2.

Did the court err in admitting a test message allegedly from
Mr. Koch to Lisa Conn due to lack of foundation?

3.

Did the court err in admitting irrelevant evidence that Mr.
Koch did not enjoy oral sex with his wife?

4.

Did the court err in admitting irrelevant evidence that C.C.
decided not to attend the special charter school she was
admitted to because she did not want to see members of the
Koch family there?

5.

Did the court err in admitting emails and text messages
allegedly from Mr. Koch to C.C. due to lack of foundation?

6.

Did the court err by failing to strike non-responsive
testimony?

7.

Did the court err by admitting evidence of prior statements
for purposes of impeachment where the witness did not deny
making the prior statement?

8.

Did the court err by admitting the audio recording of a
"confront call" due to lack of foundation?

Alternatively, did the cumulative effect of the above errors deprive
Mr. Koch of a fair trial?

(Appellant's brief, pp.3":4)
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The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Koch failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in
denying his discovery request?

2.

Has Koch failed to establish reversible error in the state's opening
statement?

3.

Has Koch failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in
overruling Koch's foundation objections to the admission of several text
and email messages?

4.

Has Koch failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in
overruling Koch's relevance objections?

5.

Has Koch failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in
overruling Koch's objections that certain testimony was non-responsive to
the corresponding question?

, 6.

Has Koch failed to show that the district Court abused its discretion in
ruling that Detective McGilvery's testimony regarding his interview with
Salina Koch was inconsistent with Koch's prior testimony about the
interview?

7.

Has Koch failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in
overruling Koch's foundation objection to the admission of an audio
recording of the confrontation call?

8.

Has Koch failed to show cumulative error?
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ARGUMENT

I.
Koch Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Denying His Discovery Request
A.

Introduction
Koch contends that the district court abused its discretion when it

concluded that the state complied with the disclosure requirements of I.C.R.
16(b)(7) regarding expert witness Mydell Yeager.

(Appellant's brief, pp.4-10.)

Specifically, Koch contends that the district court erred because the state failed
to disclose Yeager's opinions, and the facts and data for those opinions. (Id.)
Koch's claim fails because the record reveals that the state disclosed a
written summary outlining Yeager's opinions and expected testimony. Further,
the state was not required to disclose any "facts or data" because Yeager's
expert testimony did not rely on any facts or data generated by this case, and
because her well-established opinions regarding child sex abuse disclosure were
not generated from any identifiable data source.

Koch has therefore failed to

show that the district court abused its discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether disclosure of information is required by I.C.R. 16 is reviewed for

an abuse of discretion. See State v. Wilson, 142 Idaho 431, 128 P.3d 968 (Ct.
App.2006).
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C.

The State Complied With The Disclosure Requirements Of I.C.R. 16(b)(7)
Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(7) requires the state to provide, upon written

request, a written summary or report of any expert testimony that the state
intends to introduce at trial. The summary must describe "the witness's opinions,
the facts and data for those opinions, and the witness's qualifications." I.C.R.
16(b)(7).
In this case, in response to Koch's I.C.R. 16(b)(7) discovery request, the
state disclosed the following written summary regarding expert witness Mydell
Yeager:
Ms. Yeager's curriculum vitae is attached. She'll testify to
the dynamics of delayed disclosure as it relates to child sexual
abuse. The state intends to elicit expert testimony from Mydell
Yeager regarding behavior of children who have been sexually
abused and Ms. Yeager will testify that it is rare that a child
immediately discloses their sexual abuse especially when they
know the perpetrator. Ms. Yeager will testify about the dynamics of
child sexual abuse as it relates to grooming a victim, keeping the
abuse secret, the effects and threats on whether a child chooses to
disclose.
(Tr., Vol. I, pA8, Ls.12-25.)
This disclosure, and the attached curriculum vitae, was sufficient to satisfy
the I.C.R. 16(b)(7) requirement that the state disclose "the witness's opinions."
This disclosure sufficiently informed Koch that the state would elicit expert
testimony about why sex abuse victims like C.C. might not immediately disclose
sexual abuse, and about the dynamics of the type of grooming behavior Koch
engaged in.
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The state was not required to produce any "facts or data" for these
opinions because no such facts or data existed.

Yeager did not examine,

analyze, or present any conclusions regarding any evidence in this case, nor had
she ever even met C.C. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.26, L.19 - p.27, L.1.) Further, the
record shows that Yeager's general expert testimony about child sex abuse was
not based on any particular or specifically identifiable data source, but on her
years of experience as an expert in the field. In this case, the "facts and data" for
Yeager's opinion was her education, work history, and training, the nature of
each of which was disclosed to Koch.
Yeager testified that she had been a sex abuse counselor for 27 years,
has a master's degree in counseling, and had participated in specialized training.
(Tr., Vol. I, p.694, L.19 - p.696, L.16.)

She did not review any materials in

preparation for her testimony. (Tr., Vol. II, p.26, L.24 - p.27, L.1.) She testified
that her opinions regarding delayed sex abuse victim disclosure came from "lots
and lots of different data," and "lots" of published documents. (Tr., Vol. II, p.27,
Ls.10-21.)
Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(7) did not require the state to attempt to compile
an all-encompassing list of the various sources that supported Yeager's general
opinions.

Koch had the opportunity to challenge Yeager's qualifications as an

expert, to cross-examine Yeager on the basis of her testimony and expertise, or
to present his own expert testimony to either attack Yeager's opinions, or to
present contrary ones.

Koch also had the opportunity to challenge Yeager's
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qualifications as an expert witness, or to object to any of Yeager's testimony on
the ground that it was outside the scope of the state's disclosure.
The state's disclosures regarding Yeager's expert testimony complied with
the requirements of I.C.R. 16(b)(7). Koch has therefore failed to show that the
district court abused its discretion by declining to require the state to present
additional "facts and data" regarding Yeager's testimony.

II.
Koch Has Failed To Establish Reversible Error In The State's Opening Statement

A.

Introduction
Koch contends that the district court erred in overruling his objection to

comments made by the prosecutor during the state's opening statement.
(Appellant's brief, pp.10-11.) Specifically, Koch contends that the court should
have sustained his objection to the prosecutor's statement that Koch talked to
C.C. about "things he should have never shared with a 13-year-old girl." (Id.)
Koch's argument fails because the prosecutor's statement was not improper.
Further, even if the district court erred by overruling Koch's objection, any such
error was harmless.

B.

The Prosecutor's Statement Was Proper
The purpose and scope of an opening statement was outlined in State v.

Griffith, 97 Idaho 52, 539 P.2d 604 (1975):
Opening statements serve to inform the jury of the issues of
the case and briefly outline the evidence each litigant intends to
introduce to support his allegations or defenses, as the case may
be. While counsel should be allowed latitude in making an opening
9

statement, the trial court may limit the scope of that statement in
the exercise of its discretion. Generally, opening remarks should
be confined to a brief summary of evidence counsel expects to
introduce on behalf of his client's case-in-chief. Counsel should not
at that time attempt to impeach or otherwise argue the merits of
evidence that the opposing side has or will present.
Griffith, 97 Idaho at 56 (footnotes omitted); see also State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6,
13,909 P.2d 624, 631 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279,287,
178 P.3d 644, 652 (Ct. App. 2007).
During the state's opening statement, the prosecutor described the
grooming behavior engaged in by Koch - how Koch would snuggle with C.C, rub
her back and her hair, and tell her how beautiful she was.

(Tr., Vol. I, p.198,

Ls.1-19.) The prosecutor then stated that Koch "started talking to [C.C.] about
things he should have never shared with a 13-year-old girl." (Tr., Vol. I, p.198,
Ls.16-19.)

The district court overruled Koch's objection that the prosecutor's

characterization of Koch's conversations with C.C. was "argumentative."

(Tr.,

Vol. I, p.198, Ls.20-23.) The prosecutor went on to describe those conversations
in which Koch "talked to [C.C.] often about the relationship [he] had with his wife,"
"things about their sex life, about their private life, and what they fought over."
(Tr., Vol. I, p.198, L.24 - p.199, L.7.)

This portion of the opening statement

previewed C.C.'s later trial testimony, in which C.C. testified that Koch told her
that "he did not enjoy the way that [his wife] would give him a blow job, oral sex,"
and that he would watch a particular pornographic movie with his wife because
"she would get turned on." (Tr., Vol. I, p.304, L.2 - p.305, L.1 0.)
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The prosecutor's statements were not improper and were within the
latitude afforded to attorneys during opening statements.

The prosecutor's

characterization of Koch's grooming behavior and sexually explicit conversations
as inappropriate, and as something Koch "should have never shared with a 13year old girl," did not constitute impeachment or an argument regarding the
merits of the case. Instead, the prosecutor stated a broadly held societal view
regarding the appropriateness of sexually explicit conversations with children in
the context of her summary of the evidence supporting the state's theory of the
case - that Koch groomed C.C. for sexual abuse, in part by engaging her in
inappropriate and explicit sexual conversations. I n other words, the prosecutor
posited that Koch "should never have" engaged in such grooming behavior with
C.C. because it ultimately led to his commission of the charged conduct in this
case.
Because the prosecutor's opening statement was not improper, Koch has
failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in overruling his
objection.

C.

Even If The Prosecutor's Statement Was Improper, Any Error Is Harmless
An error is harmless if the appellate court is able to say, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that the jury would have reached the same result absent the
error." State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575, 578, 114 P.3d 133, 136 (Ct. App. 2005)
(citing State v. Boman, 123 Idaho 947, 950-51, 854 P.2d 290, 293-94 (Ct. App.
1993)).
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In this case, even if the prosecutor's characterization of Koch's grooming
behavior and sexually explicit conversations with C.C. as inappropriate and
something Koch "should have never shared with a 13-year old girl" was improper,
the statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether or not it was
appropriate for Koch to engage in sexually explicit discussion with C.C. was not a
contested matter at trial. Koch denied even engaging in such conversation. (Tr.,
Vol. II, p.175, Ls.1-6.) This case ultimately turned on the credibility of C.C. and
Koch, not on the social acceptability of Koch's grooming behavior.

The jury

would not have made different credibility determinations, and would not have
acquitted Koch, if the prosecutor refrained from negatively characterizing Koch's
grooming behavior.

Additionally, the jury was instructed that the attorneys'

opening statements did not constitute evidence. (Tr., Vol. I, p.184, Ls.1-3.)
Even if this Court concludes that the district court abused its discretion in
overruling Koch's objection to the prosecutor's negative characterization of
Koch's grooming behaviors, such error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. This Court should therefore affirm Koch's convictions.

III.
Koch Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Overruling Koch's Foundation Objection To The Admission Of Testimony
Describing Several Text And Email Messages
A.

Introduction
Koch contends that the district court abused its discretion in overruling his

foundation objections to testimony describing various text and email messages
sent by Koch to C.C. and C.C's mother.
12

(Appellant's brief, pp.11-15, 19-21.)

Koch's contention fails because the record reveals that the state satisfied
evidentiary foundation requirements in each instance through testimony from
C.C. and her mother, who were both able to identify Koch as the sender of the
messages.

B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of

evidence and its decision to admit or exclude evidence will be reversed only
when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion.

State v. Howard, 135

Idaho 727,721,24 P.3d 44,48 (2001); State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110,112,
106 P.3d 436,438 (2005).

C.

The State Laid Adequate Foundation For The Admission Of The
Challenged Text And Email Messages
Foundation for evidence is governed by Idaho Rule of Evidence 901,

which provides:
The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims.
I.R.E. 901 (a). By way of illustration, the rule further provides that the foundation
requirements can be met through "[t]estimony of a witness with knowledge that a
matter is what it is claimed to be." I.R.E. 901 (b)(1).
In this case, the state laid adequate foundation for testimony describing
three sets of messages challenged by Koch on appeal - Koch's text messages
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sent to C.C's mother, Koch's email messages sent to C.C., and Koch's text
messages sent to C.C.
Prior to testifying about the content of text messages sent to her by Koch,
C.C.'s mother testified that she had previously received text messages and
phone calls from Koch on her cell phone. (Tr., Vol. I, p.253, L.10 - p.255, L.18;
p.259, Ls.12-25.) C.C.'s mother testified Koch's phone number would appear on
her phone when Koch called. (Tr., Vol. I, p.259, Ls.19-25.) When C.C.'s mother
subsequently received the text messages in question, she testified the incoming
phone number was the same as the as the one utilized by Koch when he called.
(Tr., Vol. I, p.260, Ls.1-12.) Sometime later, after C.C.'s mother obtained a new
cell phone, she received a text message from a number she did not recognize.
(Tr., Vol. I, p.263, L.20 - p.264, L.5.) C.C.'s mother testified she responded by
inquiring as to the identity of the sender, who then identified himself as Michael
Koch. (Tr., Vol. I, p.264, Ls.6-19.)
Prior to testifying about the content of emails sent to her by Koch, C.C.
testified that she was familiar with Koch's email address because it was identified
within her email account contact list as belonging to Koch. (Tr., Vol. I, p.336,
L.22 - p.337, L.17.)
because

Salina

Koch possessed C.C.'s email address, C.C. explained,

Koch,

Michael

Koch's

wife,

utilized

it for Girl

Scout

communications. (Tr., Vol. I, p.336, L.25 - p.337, L.4.)
Finally, prior to testifying about the content of text messages sent to her by
Koch, and prior to the admission of photographs depicting these text messages,
C.C. testified that she had called and talked with Koch on her phone in the
14

presence of detectives for purposes of the investigation into Koch's conduct.
(Tr., Vol. I, p.358, L.1 - p.359, L.2.) When C.C. called Koch again several days
later, utilizing the same phone number that she had used previously to contact
Koch, the call went to Koch's voicemail. (Tr., Vol. I, p.359, L.25 - p.360, L.20.)
C.C. then initiated a text message exchange with Koch. (Tr., Vol. I, p.361, Ls.16.) C.C. identified state's exhibit 17 as photographs depicting the text messages
contained in that exchange.

(Tr., Vol. I, 361, L.12 - p.374, L.12.)

She also

identified the two phone numbers displayed on the text messages as hers and
Koch's, respectively. (Tr., Vol. I, p.365, Ls.7-11.)
In each of these three instances, the district court properly recognized and
utilized its discretion to overrule Koch's foundation objections to the text and
email messages. (Tr., Vol. I, p.260, Ls.13-21; p.335, L.22 - p.337, L.19; p.363,
L.8 - p.364, L.2.) Contrary to Koch's apparent contention below and on appeal
(Tr., Vol. I, p.260, Ls.16-19; p.336, Ls.6-9;· p.363, Ls.14-22; Appellant's brief,
p.13), the state was not required to present eyewitness testimony from
individuals who actually observed Koch at the other end of the text and email
exchanges.

It was sufficient for foundational purposes that C.C. and C.C.'s

mother testified that they recognized Koch's phone number and email address,
and that the content of those communications led both to believe that they were
communicating with Koch.
On appeal, Koch relies on State v. Harris, 358 S.W.3d 172 (Mo. Ct. App.
2011), in which the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's exclusion
of text messages on foundational grounds.
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(Appellant's brief, p.14.)

Koch

argues, "[t]here [in State v. Harris], like here, the foundation for the offered text
messages came solely through the testimony of the recipient.")

(Appellant's

brief, p.14.) However, the Missouri Court of Appeals did not hold that adequate
foundation for the admission of text messages requires some type of admission
from both the sender and recipient of the message.

Instead, the Court

recognized that "[s]uch proof [establishing adequate foundation] could even be
established by the person receiving the message testifying that he regularly
receives text messages from the author from this number, or something
distinctive about the text message indicating the author wrote it, such as a
personalized signature."

Harris, 358 S.W.3d at 175. 1 This is precisely what

happened in this case.

C.C. and C.C.'s mother were familiar with Koch, his

phone number, and his email address, from their prior contacts with him. This
knowledge, combined with the nature of the content of the communications
constituted adequate foundation for the admission of the evidence.
The state laid adequate foundation for the admission of testimony
describing the challenged text and email messages. Koch has therefore failed to
show that the district court abused its discretion in overruling his objection to this
evidence.

1 See also State v. Thompson, 777 N.W.2d 617, 622-626 (N.D. 2010) (holding
that adequate foundation for the admission of testimony about the context of text
messages could be laid entirely through testimony of the text message recipient).
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IV.
Koch Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Overruling Koch's Relevance Objections
A.

Introduction
Koch contends that the district court abused its discretion by admitting

certain evidence at trial on relevance grounds.

(Appellant's brief, pp.16, 22.)

Specifically, Koch contends that the court erred by admitting C.C.'s testimony
that Koch graphically described aspects of his sex life to her, and admitting
Salina Koch's testimony that she had expressed her belief to Meridian Detective
Christopher McGilvery that her husband would not have "done anything" if he
had been happy in their marriage. (Appellant's brief, pp.16, 22.)
The record reveals that the challenged testimony regarding Koch's
discussion of sexual matters with C.C. was relevant to the crimes charged.
Further, Koch failed to preserve his relevance challenge to Salina Koch's
testimony about her interview with Detective McGilvery.

Koch has therefore

failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the
challenged testimony.

B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of

evidence and its decision to admit or exclude evidence will be reversed only
when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. Howard, 135 Idaho at 721,
24 P.3d at48; Robinett, 141 Idaho at 112,106 P.3d at 438.
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C.

The Challenged Evidence Was Relevant
To be admissible, evidence must be relevant. I.R.E. 401, 402. Evidence

that tends to prove the existence of a fact of consequence in the case, and has
any tendency to make the existence of that fact more probable than it would be
without the evidence is relevant. State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 544, 547, 768 P.2d
807, 810 (Ct. App. 1989).
The general rule in Idaho is that an appellate court will not consider an
alleged error on appeal in the absence of a timely objection at trial.

State v.

Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 181, 254 P.3d 77, 82 (Ct. App. 2011); State v.
Thompson, 132 Idaho 628,634,977 P.2d 890, 896 (1999). "An objection on one
ground will not preserve a separate and different basis for excluding the
evidence." State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 885, 119 P.3d at 660, 653 (Ct.
App. 2005) (citing State v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 880, 11 P.3d 494, 499 (Ct.
App. 2000); State v. Enyeart, 123 Idaho 452,454,849 P.2d 125, 127 (Ct. App.
1993)).

1.

Evidence That Koch Engaged In Explicit Discussion With C.C.
About His Sex Life Was Relevant

At trial, C. C. testified that Koch engaged her in explicit conversation about
his sex life with his wife. (Tr., Vol. I, p.302, L.22 - p.305, L.10.) Specifically, C.C.
testified that Koch told her that he did not like the way his wife performed oral sex
on him.

(Tr., Vol. I, p.304, Ls.6-17.)

The district court overruled Koch's

relevance objection to this testimony. (Tr., Vol. I, p.304, Ls.9-11.)
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On appeal, Koch contends that this evidence was not relevant because
"[w]hether or not Mr. Koch enjoyed his wife's oral sex techniques has nothing to
do with whether he engaged in the acts alleged in the Indictment." (Appellant's
brief, p.16.)

Koch's argument is misguided.

The relevance of this testimony

does not stem from Koch's opinions about his wife's oral sex techniques, but
from the very fact that Koch engaged in such sexually explicit conversation with
C.C.

These explicit conversations, along with Koch purchasing underwear for

C.C., and expressing his love for her, constituted evidence of Koch's grooming of
C.C. for sexual abuse. Evidence of such grooming behavior is relevant to the
charged conduct in that it constitutes a "continuing criminal design to cultivate a
relationship with [the victim] such that she would concede to his sexual
demands." State v. Truman, 150 Idaho 714,722,249 P.3d 1169, 1177 (Ct. App.
2011 ).
Because Koch's explicit sexual conversations with C.C. were relevant to
the charges against him, Koch has failed to show that the district court abused its
discretion in overruling his relevance objection to the testimony.

2.

Koch Failed To Preserve His Relevance Challenge To Evidence
That His Wife Told The Detective That Koch "Wouldn't Have Done
Anything" If He Had Been Happy In His Marriage

At trial, the state cross-examined Koch's wife, Salina, about her interview
with Detective McGilvery. (Tr., Vol. I, p.638, L.14 - p.671, L.18.) In the course of
that cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Salina about her statements to the
detective that she was responsible for Koch's actions because if Koch had been
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happy in their marriage, then "he wouldn't have done anything."

(Tr., Vol. I,

p.664, LA - p.666, L.g.)
Koch made two objections over the course of the challenged portion of
this cross-examination.

Koch first objected on the grounds that the state's

question was vague. (Tr., Vol., I, p.664, Ls.13-15.) Koch then made a generic
objection without specifying a ground, after which he requested a sidebar with
the court.

(Tr., Vol. I, p.665, Ls.18-22.)

The district court overruled both

objections. (T., Vol. I, p.664, L.13 - p.665, L.21.) Koch did not object to any of
the state's questioning or elicited testimony on relevance grounds, therefore, the
district court did not have the opportunity to rule on the relevance of this
evidence. Koch has therefore failed to preserve his challenge to the relevance of
this testimony.
Even if Koch had preserved this relevance objection, the challenge fails
because the testimony in question was relevant to the charged conduct. Salina's
statements to the interviewing detective pOinted to a potential motive for, or
reasoning behind, Koch's criminal conduct - that he was unhappy in his
marriage.
Koch failed to preserve any relevance objection to Salina Koch's
testimony that she told Detective McGlivery that she felt responsible for Koch's
actions in that Koch would "not have done anything" had he been happy in their
marriage. In any event, such evidence was relevant, and Koch has thus failed to
show that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony.
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V.
Koch Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Overruling Koch's Objections That Certain Testimony Was Non-Responsive
A.

Introduction
Koch contends that the district abused its discretion in overruling his

objections that certain trial witness responses to questioning was nonresponsive. (Appellant's brief, pp.17-19, 21-22.) Koch's contention fails because
the record reveals that the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling
these objections.

B.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Overruling Koch's
Objections
Idaho Rule of Evidence 611 provides that the "court shall exercise

reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses .. ,,"
Exercise of this control is a question of discretion. State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho
496, 503, 988 P.2d 1170, 1177 (1999); State v. Johnson, 132 Idaho 726, 729,
979 P.2d 128,131 (Ct. App. 1999).

1.

C.C's Reasons For Not Attending The Charter School

At trial, the following exchange occurred during the state's direct
examination of C.C.:
Q:

Okay. So other than with the exception of
finishing up Girl Scouts, did you - did you ever
even see the defendant again?

A:

No. I even wouldn't go to Renaissance High
School, the high school I had gotten into,
because 21

Defense Counsel:

Objection. Your Honor

Court:

Overruled.

Defense Counsel:

It's nonresponsive.

Court:

Overruled.

Q:

Did - what was that you were saying about -

A:

I had been accepted along with T.K. into
Renaissance High School and I didn't go there,
I chose not to go because I didn't want to see
them. I didn't want to see Michael or T.K. or
Salina.

(Tr., Vol. I, p.333, L.12 - p.334, L.3.)
At the next break in the trial, the district court explained that it overruled
Koch's non-responsive objection because such an objection cannot be raised by
the nonquestioning party. (Tr., Vol. I, p.342, Ls.9-19.) The court provided both
parties with an excerpt from the Idaho Trial Handbook, which cited State ex reI.
Rich v. Bair, 83 Idaho 475,365 P.2d 261 (1961), for this proposition. (R., p.112,
n.4, Attachment A; Tr., Vol. I, p.342, Ls.14-19.)

Koch subsequently filed a

document entitled, "Authority In Support of Defendant's Use Of The 'NonResponsive Objection," in which he argued that the district court's ruling was
incorrect. (R., pp.111-117.) The next day, prior to the resumption of the trial, the
district court rejected Koch's invitation to revisit its ruling. (Tr., Vol. I, p.499, LS.321.)
The district court's ruling did not constitute an abuse of discretion. In Rich,
83 Idaho at 219-220, 365 P.2d at 480-481, the Idaho Supreme Court explained
the reasoning behind the "general rule" that the non-responsive objection is
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available only to the questioning party: "The reason for the rule is to avoid
unnecessary interruptions by opposing counsel and to allow counsel conducting
the examination to control the interrogation."
The present case illustrates the reasoning behind this general rule. C.C.'s
response to the prosecutor's question regarding whether C.C. ever saw the
defendant again was not directly responsive. However, even if the district court
had sustained Koch's objection and struck C.C.'s response, the prosecutor could
have simply asked another question to elicit the same information. In such an
instance, Koch's objection would have only served to interfere with the
prosecution's direct examination, which was the concern expressed by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Rich. Koch did not object to the content of C.C.'s response on
any other specific grounds, or raise any concern about any improper impact of
C.C.'s response on the jury.
Further, in this particular case, the district court clearly sought to "avoid
unnecessary interruption" by Koch's defense counsel and to "allow [the
prosecutor] conducting the examination to control the interrogation." Later in the
trial, the district court made a finding that the excessive number of objections and
requested sidebars initiated by Koch's defense counsel over the course of the
trial were "interposed for nothing more than to interrupt the flow of testimony."
(Tr., Vol. I, p.683, L.10 - p.687, L.21.)

The district court acted within its

discretion to attempt to limit Koch's interruptions where there was no clear
violation of the Idaho Rules of Evidence and no risk of unfair prejudice to Koch.
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On appeal, Koch contends that the district court abused its discretion
because its "assertion that the nonquestioning party can never make a nonresponsive objection goes too far." (Appellant's brief, p .18.) However, the record
reveals that the district court was aware that the Rich non-responsiveness rule
was merely general, and that it itself retained discretion as to its rulings when
such objections were made.
"almost every instance".

The court stated that the Rich rule applies in

(Tr., Vol. I, p.499, Ls.13-21.) Further, the very Idaho

Trial Handbook excerpt provided to the parties by the district court also referred
to the Rich rule as a "general rule." (R., p.117.)
The district court properly exercised its discretion in overruling Koch's nonresponsiveness objection.

Koch has therefore failed to show that the district

court abused its discretion.

2.

C.C.'s Statements On Cross-Examination Regarding Her Activities
Following The First Time She Had Sex With Koch

The following exchange took place during Koch's counsel's crossexamination of C.C.:
Q:

And you testified when you allegedly had sex the first time, it
was on the bed. And then you were upset and your
testimony was that [Koch] told you to go take a bath. So you
were laying on the bathroom floor and crying?

A:

No. He told me to go take a bath in T.K.'s bedroom because
he's very adamant about douching and things after you have
sex, so-

(Tr., Vol. I, p.423, Ls.18-25.) The district court overruled Koch's motion to strike
C.C.'s answer as non-responsive. (Tr., Vol. I, p.424, Ls.1-7.)
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C.C.'s answer was responsive to Koch's defense counsel's question.
Defense counsel asked C.C. if she lied down on the floor and cried after she had
sex with Koch. C.C. did not refuse to answer the question - she responded in
the negative. While C.C. then provided testimony regarding what she was doing
instead and why she was doing it, Koch did not object to the content of this
testimony on relevance or any other grounds.

Because C.C.'s answer was

responsive to Koch's counsel's question, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by overruling Koch's objection.
Even if the district court abused its discretion in declining to strike C.C.'s
testimony, any such error was harmless. An error is harmless if the appellate
court is able to say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have
reached the same result absent the error." Lopez, 141 Idaho at 578, 114 P.3d at
136 (citing Boman, 123 Idaho at 950-51, 854 P.2d at 293-94.)

In this case,

C.C.'s testimony that Koch told her to take a bath and that he was concerned
about hygiene was rather innocuous, especially in light of other admitted
testimony regarding Koch's sexual activities with C.C. Additionally, the state had
already elicited similar information in its direct examination of C.C., and Koch's
counsel's himself referenced the bath in his own question.

(Tr., Vol. I, p.322,

Ls.17-19; p.423, Ls.19-21.) This Court can find beyond a reasonable doubt that
the jury would have convicted Koch even without C.C.s's testimony about her
activities after having sex with Koch.
The district court acted within its discretion to exercise reasonable control
over the mode and order of interrogation when it overruled Koch's non25

responsiveness objection. Koch has therefore failed to establish error. Even if
the district court did abuse its discretion, any such error was harmless.

VI.
Koch Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Ruling
That Detective McGilvery's Testimony Regarding His Interview With Salina Koch
Was Inconsistent With Koch's Prior Testimony

A.

Introduction
Koch contends that the district court abused its discretion by overruling

certain objections he made during the state's direct examination of Detective
McGilvery.

(Appellant's brief, pp.22-23.)

Specifically, he contends that the

district court abused its discretion in overruling his objections to Detective
McGilvery's testimony about Salina Koch's expressed suspicion about her
husband's conduct. (Id.) Koch contends that this exchange did not constitute
proper impeachment because Detective McGilvery's challenged testimony was
not inconsistent with Salina's earlier trial testimony. (Id.)
A review of the record reveals that Detective McGilvery's testimony
regarding Salina's suspicions was inconsistent with her trial testimony, during the
course of which she appeared to champion her husband's innocence. Koch has
therefore failed to show that the district court abused its discretion. Further, even
if the district court erred in overruling Koch's objections, any such error was
harmless.
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B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of

evidence and its decision to admit or exclude evidence will be reversed only
when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. Howard, 135 Idaho at 721,
24 P.3d at 48; Robinett, 141 Idaho at 112, 106 P.3d at 438.

C.

Detective McGilvery's Challenged Testimony Was Inconsistent With
Salina Koch's
Idaho Rule of Evidence 607 states, "The credibility of a witness may be

attacked by any party including the party calling the witness." Prior inconsistent
statements,

which

are governed by

I.R.E.

613,

constitute non-hearsay

statements which may be elicited for impeachment purposes.

See Small v.

State, 132 Idaho 327,334-35,971 P.2d 1151, 1158-59 (Ct. App. 1998).
At trial in this case, the state called Koch's wife, Salina, as a witness. (Tr.,
Vol. I, p.629, L.21 - p.630, L.5.)

The prosecutor questioned Salina about a

recorded interview she participated in with Detective McGilvery.

(Tr., Vol. I,

p.638, L.14 - p.671, L.12.) The prosecutor asked Salina if she had made various
specific statements to Detective McGilvery. (Id.) Salina admitted making some
of the statements, denied making others, and claimed not to remember making
others. (Id.)
The exchange was occasionally contentious, and the district court
declared Salina to be a hostile witness.

(Tr., Vol. I, p.638, Ls.6-9.)

appeared to attempt to support her husband.

Salina

She denied that C.C. and her

husband had a "very close relationship." (Tr., Vol. I, p.647, Ls.14-17.) She also
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appeared to accuse C.C. of attempting to initiate some type of romantic
encounter with Koch, in testifying that she had seen C.C. "petting" Koch's foot
with her hand, and that Koch "does not know when a woman or anyone has any
interest in him." (Tr., Vol. I, p.667, L.3 - p.668, L.1; p.671, Ls.6-12; p.672, L.23p.673, L.22.) At one point Salina blurted out that her "husband is innocent," after
which she was admonished by the district court, which struck the statement. (Tr.,
Vol. I, p.666, Ls.12-23.) When the prosecutor asked Salina if she recalled telling
Detective McGilvery that she was responsible for what happened, Salina
responded that she "was very upset and confused."

(Tr., Vol. I, p.664, L.9 -

p.665, L.21.) Then, Salina admitted that she told Detective McGilvery that had
Koch been happy in their marriage, then he "wouldn't have done anything." (Tr.,
Vol. I, p.666, Ls.4-9.)
The state expressed its intention to attempt to admit the recording of
Detective McGilvery's interview with Salina. (Tr., Vol. I, p.655, Ls.6-16; p.688,
Ls.2-11; p.712, L.23 - p.713, L.10.)

Initially, the district court indicated that it

would admit portions of Detective McGilvery's interview of Salina as substantive
evidence because Salina had testified that she had recently listened to a
recording of the interview and it had not refreshed her recollection as to certain
topics.

(Tr., Vol. I, p.651, Ls.1-8; p.655, Ls.17-20; p.688, L.24 - p.689, L.5;

p.714, L.17 - p.715, L.9.)

However, after reviewing the recording, the district

court elected not to admit the recording itself as substantive evidence, but to
instead permit the state to call Detective McGilvery to testify about the interview,
to the extent Salina's interview statements were inconsistent with her trial
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testimony. (Tr., Vol. II, p.21, L.3 - p.24, L.11.) The district court instructed the
jury that Detective McGilvery's testimony regarding Salina's interview statements
were to be considered only for the purpose of impeaching Salina's prior trial
testimony, and not for the truth of any matter asserted. (Tr., Vol. II, p.41, Ls.19 25.)
Detective McGilvery then testified about his interview with Salina.

(Tr.,

Vol. II, p.38, L.17 - p.58, L.13.) Relevant to Koch's appellate challenge, the state
elicited testimony from Detective McGilvery regarding Salina's previously held
suspicions of her husband's guilt.

Detective McGilvery answered in the

affirmative in response to the prosecutor's question about "whether or not
[Salina] recalled talking to [C. C.] about her concerns that something was going
on between [C.C.] and [Koch]." (Tr., Vol. II, p.43, L.19 - p.44, L.8.) Additionally,
after the prosecutor asked Detective McGilvery whether he "ask[ed] Salina in
particular if she believed there was something wrong in the relationship [between
Koch and C.C.]," Detective McGilvery responded that "[Salina] had suspicions
that something was going on, but she wasn't for sure what." (Tr., Vol. II, p.44,
L.24 - p.45, L.11.) The district court overruled Koch's objection to this testimony.
(Tr., Vol. II, p.43, Ls.24-25; p.45, Ls.3-4.)
Detective

McGilvery's

testimony

about

Salina's

vague

expressed

suspicions about Koch was admissible because it was inconsistent with Salina's
prior testimony. The state was entitled to contrast the support Salina expressed
for Koch during her trial testimony, and her testimony that she was "upset and
confused" during the interview with Detective McGilvery, with evidence of her
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previously-held suspicions about her husband, and with her ability to clearly
express these suspicions to Detective McGilvery despite her allegedly confused
state.
The district court properly overruled Koch's objections because Detective
McGilvery's testimony about Salina's expressed suspicions of Koch's conduct
was inconsistent with Salina's prior testimony. Koch has therefore failed to show
that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony.

D.

Even If The Admission Of The Testimony Constituted Error, Any Such
Error Was Harmless
Even if the district court abused its discretion by declining to overrule

Koch's objections to portions of Detective McGilvery's testimony, such error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Significantly, the district court provided the jury with a limiting instruction
regarding Detective McGilvery's testimony about his interview with Salina. The
district court instructed the jury that the testimony was not to be considered for
the truth of any matter asserted. (Tr., Vol. II, p.41, Ls.19-25.) Because this Court
must "presume that the jury followed the jury instructions given by the trial court,"
State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 718, 264 P.3d 54, 59 (2011) (citation omitted), it
must also presume that the jury in this case utilized Detective McGilvery's
challenged testimony only as impeachment evidence.

The matter of the

credibility of Salina, who was not an eyewitness to any of the charged conduct,
was not a central issue at trial.
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Further, evidence that Salina expressed some suspicion of Koch to
Detective McGilvery was not so inflammatory or prejudicial as to warrant a
vacating of Koch's conviction. The basis of Salina's suspicion was not developed
at trial, aside from Salina's own explanation that the interviewing officers told her
that they had "100% proof" of Koch's guilt, that Koch may have been unhappy in
the marriage, and she was "upset and confused" when she expressed these
suspicions. (Tr., VoL I, p.664, L.4-p.665, L.21; p.670, L.4-p.671, L.12.)
Koch has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in
overruling his objection to portions of Detective McGilvery's testimony describing
his interview with Salina Koch. Even if the district court did abuse its discretion,
any such error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

VII.
Koch Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Overruling Koch's Foundation Objection To The Admission Of An Audio
Recording Of The Confrontation Call
A.

Introduction
Koch contends that the district court abused its discretion in overruling his

foundation objection to the admission of an audio recording of the confrontation
call between himself and C.C. (Appellant's brief, pp.24-26.) Koch has failed to
show error because a review of the record reveals that the state presented
adequate foundation for the evidence.
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B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of

evidence and its decision to admit or exclude evidence will be reversed only
when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. Howard, 135 Idaho at 721,
24 P.3d at 48; Robinett, 141 Idaho at 112,106 P.3d at 438.

C.

The State Laid Proper Foundation For Admission Of The Audio Recording
Of The Confrontation Call
As discussed above, foundation for evidence is governed by Idaho Rule of

Evidence 901, which provides:
The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims.
I.R.E. 901 (a). The foundation requirements can be met through U[t]estimony of a

witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be."

I.R.E.

901 (b)(1).
In this case, prior to the admission of the audio recording of the
confrontation call between C.C. and Koch, the state elicited testimony from
Detective McGilvery, who facilitated the call. (Tr., Vol. II, p.29, L.1 - p.35, L.2.)
Detective McGilvery testified that he was physically present with C.C. when C.C.
made the call to Koch, and that he reviewed state's exhibit 19 and confirmed it to
be an audio recording of that phone call. (Tr., Vol. II, p.32, L.2 - p.33, L.24.) He
also testified that C.C. used her own phone to make the call, which demonstrated
that C.C. knew how to get into contact with Koch. (Tr., Vol. II, p.32, Ls.13-16.)
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Earlier in the trial, C.C. testified that she participated in the confrontation call
during which she was able to speak with Koch. (Tr., Vol. I, p.358, L.1 - p.365,
L.3.)

This evidence constituted sufficient foundation for the admission of the

audio recording of the phone call.
The state laid adequate foundation for the admission of an audio recording
of the conformation call between C.C. and Koch.

Koch has therefore failed to

show that the district court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence.

VIII.
Koch Has Failed To Show Cumulative Error
"The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of a conviction when there
is an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, but
when aggregated, the errors show the absence of a fair trial, in contravention of
the defendant's constitutional right to due process." State v. Draper, 151 Idaho
576,594,261 P.3d 853, 871 (2011) (citations, quotations and alteration omitted).
A necessary predicate to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding
of more than one error. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396,958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App.
1998).
Koch has failed to show any error, much less two or more errors. Thus,
the doctrine of cumulative error does not apply in this case.

See,~,

State, 130 Idaho 115, 121, 937 P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997).

LaBelle v.

Further, the

alleged errors in this case do not implicate the central issues of this trial - Koch's
and C.C.'s credibility.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon the jury verdicts finding Koch guilty of four counts of lewd conduct with a
minor under sixteen.
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